Today’s page is a doozy, but it’s the last page of the chapter, so hang in there! The first issue involves an inherited dispute: Orphans collecting on a promissory note their father have must take an oath, even though their father could’ve collected without an oath (just based on the strength of the promissory note). Rav and Shmuel differentiate two cases:
If Kiddo’s dad, the original plaintiff, died first, then the transaction obligation exists between Kiddo and Junior’s dad (before his death). If Kiddo didn’t collect then, he must swear an oath. But if Junior’s dad died first, Kiddo’s dad could’ve collected from Junior (and didn’t). The best Junior can do is swear that he’s unaware of his dad having paid the debt during Kiddo’s dad’s life. Rabbi Elazar thinks that, in this situation, it is Kiddo who should swear as to the debt to the best of his knowledge, and collect on the basis of his oath.
This leads us to an explanatory interlude:
The dilemma is this: There is only one witness, Bro, who saw Dude snatch the metal; yet you can’t exonerate Dude, because of Bro’s testimony. Yet if they ask Dude to swear, he’ll swear that he did take the item (which is true), which makes him a robber (הָוֵה לֵיהּ כְּגַזְלָן), and a robber cannot take an oath. Argh! Rabbi Abba would require Dude to pay in these circumstances.
Alright, back to Kiddo and Junior. Rava thinks that there are situations in which the original parties would have had to swear an oath, but the heirs are exempt:
According to Rava, in the situation on the left, Junior can swear the oath because he knew what his dad had known. In the situation on the right, though, there’s no point requiring an oath from Junior.
Shimon ben Tarfon thought that the verse “The oath of God will be between the two of them” (שְׁבֻעַ֣ת יְהוָ֗ה תִּהְיֶה֙ בֵּ֣ין שְׁנֵיהֶ֔ם), Exodus 22:10, merely means that if one litigant forces an oath on another, and the oath is false, both parties are responsible for the lie. And since we’ve mentioned him, the text includes a few of his off-topic sayings.
The Gemara now turns to the Mishnaic bit about the storekeeper. Recall this scenario
Rabbi Yehuda Ha-nasi thinks that the worker should swear to the grocer, rather than to the employer; Rava thinks they swear to the employer but with the grocer present, to ensure they don’t lie (as he knows whether or not he paid them).
The next issue involves two pairs of witnesses testifying in opposite ways (either Pair A or Pair B is lying). Rav Hisda would disqualify both, given the suspicion. And yet, according to Rav Huna, if two witnesses’ testimonies conflict about how high the moon was (beyond an understandable discrepancy), neither is automatically disqualified, and either one can join a fresh person to form a valid pair of witnesses.
The Gemara now comments on the cases involving the greengrocer and the money changer: they understand that Rabbi Yehuda sees them as different, because a money changer is not in the habit of handing out coins unless he received the money first (and at the greengrocer’s it’s not necessarily like that).
After a few immaterial comments about the Mishna’s statements on partners, serfs, and household managers, this chapter, too, comes to an end. Here’s your sticker:
